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The unique nature of migrations to Spain over the last decade: diverse and 
intense migratory flows in a decade of strong economic growth  
Like other countries in Southern Europe, Spain became a destination for immigration in the 
1980s for the first time in its recent history. Among other reasons, this transformation was 
caused by the country’s rapid economic growth over the past two decades, the growing 
demand for unskilled labor, the consolidation of heavily segmented labor markets and the size 
of the “informal” economy (Baldwin-Edwards and Arango 1999). Two demographic 
parameters can also be seen as indirect stimuli of this migratory transition due to their effect 
on the labor market: first, both the Spanish population and active population have been aging 
due to a sharp fall in birth rates (Fernández-Cordón 2001) and second, the population has 
limited internal mobility and is irregularly distributed throughout the different regions of the 
country. 
As is the case in other countries in Southern Europe, like Italy, the dynamics of Spanish 
migration are unique; a distinctiveness stemming from the diversity of the countries of origin 
and the kinds of immigrants seeking to settle there. This includes migratory flows of workers 
from Latin America, Africa and Eastern Europe and also migrations of retirees and workers 
from other European Union member states. At the start of 2009, the largest group of 
foreigners in Spain was Romanian (776,576). Among the rest of the EU member states, the 
largest groups were British (374,600) and German (190,584). For non EU countries Moroccans 
were the largest group (710,401), followed by Ecuadorians (413,715) and Columbians 
(292,971). The most recent flows originate from a diverse collection of countries that include 
Paraguay, Brazil, Ukraine and Pakistan. Unlike Northern Europe, where it is much more 
common for immigrants to seek asylum, the Spanish migratory model has mostly been based 
on immigrants seeking work, although there is a component of retirement migrations. 
In addition to being very diverse, immigration flows to Spain have also been extremely 
intense over the past decade. The statistics are eye opening. In 1999 there were fewer than 
750,000 foreign residents in Spain, representing only 1.86% of the population. The latest data, 
from the beginning of 2009, indicate that just ten years later there are more than 5.5 million 
immigrants1, which is 12% of the population. The immigrant population has grown rapidly from 
the second half of the 1990s and the growth was particularly intense between 2000 and 2003 
and again in 2005, with the percentage of interannual variation surpassing 48.36% in some 
cases. This is why Arango stated in a 2006 article that Europe was becoming an immigration 
destination mostly due to the intense flows directed at Spain and Italy (Arango 2006). We 
should also remember that throughout the last decade a third of the new migratory flows 
toward Europe were directed at Spain, making it the OECD country with the second largest 
number of immigrants received, after the United States, and the first in relative terms.  
Other well known aspects of Spain’s migration experience are the high number of 
irregular immigrants among foreign residents and the frequency in which most immigrants 
spend at least some time in an irregular legal and social status during their migratory process 
and experience. One of the most common pathways to irregularity is known as “befallen” 
irregularity2
Although the factors which explain the establishment and persistence of migratory 
flows are extremely complex, the intensity of this immigration can be explained in part as a 
result of the growth of the Spanish economy over the past decade –which had the strongest 
growth among the original 15 EU member states over that time period– and also the demand 
of the labor market during a period of intense job creation. However, the development of the 
Spanish economy has largely depended on the services sector, tourism and construction. 
Dependence on these sectors has made the economy structurally weak and created a growing 
gap in productivity over the years when compared to the rest of the European economy 
(FEDEA 2009). At the same time, this economic situation has led directly to an increase in the 
demand for unskilled workers in those sectors (construction, services and tourism) and 
others, such as agriculture, which offers very seasonal employment, and domestic services, the 
demand for which has grown as a consequence of the increased level of education of Spanish 
women and their massive incorporation into the labor market, as well as the aging of the 
population and the fact that the Spanish Baby Boom generation has arrived at their 
reproductive cycle
 (Izquierdo 2006). 
3
In light of this information, Cachón concluded that the intensity of the migratory flows 
toward Spain over the past decade was caused by the growing demand of its labor market, the 
attraction of its informal economy and the higher standards of Spanish workers when deciding 
which jobs were “acceptable” to them, a tendency related to the growing social and economic 
prospects of the country (Cachón 2002).  
.  
The most recent economic studies have identified the importance of immigration in 
Spain’s economic growth between 1994 and 2007, in particular its positive influence on GDP 
and the public coffers (Oficina Económica del Presidente del Gobierno 2006). They have also 
shown the advantages that it has provided to the Spanish labor market (Dolado and Vázquez 
2007). Migrants have occupied low paying jobs which are difficult to staff with native workers, 
thereby promoting the development of businesses and sectors, without having a negative 
impact on the employment or wages of local workers (Pajares 2007, 2008, 2009). 
The participation of foreign workers in the Spanish labor market has been particularly 
intense throughout the last decade, as the data from the Economically Active Population 
Survey (EAPS4
In 2005, immigrants had a global activity rate of 78.9% which was almost 24 points 
higher than that of the Spanish (which was 55.2%). And as Cachón has pointed out, this 
difference in global activity was not a random occurrence in the middle of the decade, but 
rather a persistent tendency, although variable over time. This persistance is clearly seen in the 
EAPS carried out from 1996 to the present (Cachón 2007, 2009). However, it should be noted 
that the younger average age of the foreigners largely explains this difference. In addition, 
foreign workers tend to work in the lower categories of the Spanish labor market, especially in 
jobs which pay the least amount of taxes (unskilled laborers, first level clerks and second level 
clerks). They are clearly concentrated in the lowest scale jobs.   
) shows. Unlike in Northern and Central Europe, not only do immigrants in 
Spain account for a large part of the active population, but they also have higher rates of 
activity than the native population. In 1996 the percentage of the active population that was 
not made up of nationals of an EU member state was barely above 100,000, or 0.7% of the 
active population. This data is starkly contrasted with those available for the middle of the 
current decade: almost 2,000,000 foreign workers from outside the EU were incorporated 
into the active population, representing 9.3% of all workers in Spain.  
For years, the massive incorporation of migrants into the Spanish labor market, 
especially into unskilled jobs in construction, hotel services, agriculture and domestic service 
occurred with very little intervention by the Spanish government. During this period, market 
forces were the main source of internal regulation of foreign workers in the Spanish economy. 
 
Spanish policy on regulating labor flows  
Until recently, the Spanish authorities did little to coordinate labor flows arriving from abroad. 
The needs of the economic sectors mentioned above, coupled with lax regulation of the 
internal labor market, allowed immigrants to enter Spain “through the back door”, find work 
in the informal economy and later receive legal status through documentation programs. The 
creation of a quota system in 1993 was the first attempt to create an orderly regulation of 
migrations. This system was elaborated with the participation of all sectors involved and its 
strategy was to channel the immigrants toward sectors that lacked workers. However, when 
put into practice this system faced many obstacles including administrative difficulties, its own 
inflexibility, slowness and a lack of coordination between institutions. In addition, there were 
disparities between the actual needs of the labor market and the size of the quotas, leading 
many irregular workers and businesses to simply bypass the quota system altogether by using 
the informal economy. As has been repeatedly pointed out by experts, the quota system 
basically worked as a reactive system of concealed annual regularization that indirectly gave the 
Spanish economy access to the foreign workers it needed (Izquierdo 1996).  
During the first few years of this decade an increase in migratory flows and the 
demand for workers in certain economic sectors were accompanied by a series of initiatives 
designed to manage labor migrations from abroad in a more orderly fashion, while at the same 
time reinforcing the fight against irregular immigration and increasing border security. The 
objective of the new measures was to develop an active policy, rather than a reactive one, and 
to organize the flows so that they would meet the needs of the labor market. This was 
explained in one of the most complete texts on Spanish policy available at that time, a 
document known as the Plan Greco5
After 2004, Spanish policy on the management of labor flows from abroad has been 
more active and planned. Over the last few years the quota system has been modified several 
times. First of all, only foreigners who were not currently in Spain could take part in this 
program and the selection of workers was carried out in the country of origin. Second, the 
redesign included the participation of new actors, among them local governments; this also 
included more active participation by the business sector and trade unions. In the past few 
years, the new way the quota works has been combined with other new initiatives directed at 
regulating migratory flows in accordance with the specific needs of the labor market. The new 
measures have included creating the Special Catalog of Vacant Jobs, which is basically a list of 
employment areas which have difficulty finding enough workers to meet their demand, 
developed by Spanish employment agencies with the participation of regional governments; the 
appearance of “job search” visas; and the regulation of seasonal or campaign work permits 
which are valid for nine months. In order to start recruiting workers in their countries of 
origin, over the past few years a series of bilateral agreements were negotiated with Latin 
American, European and African countries (Ferrero and López -Sala 2009). In addition, the 
labor market has begun to be monitored more closely by increasing the number of work 
inspections.  
, which was published in 2000. This program was 
structured around different actions: approving criteria for the admission of immigrants, in 
particular the number of immigrants that would make up the annual quota; specifying the 
number of seasonal workers needed; and finally, establishing mechanisms which would allow 
workers to be chosen and trained in their countries of origin. These actions were meant to 
redesign and stimulate the quota system in a way that would further this new policy. 
In 2007, the Unidad de Grandes Empresas (UGE) [Large Business Office] was created, 
one of the first Spanish initiatives to manage the flows of skilled workers. This is an office of 
the Ministry of Labor and Immigration which handles work authorizations and residence 
permits for highly skilled workers such as business executives, tech workers, scientists, 
university professors or internationally renowned artists who will provide transnational 
services as paid employees for economic, social, labor and cultural reasons.  
As we shall see, the economic crisis and the employment crisis caused by the severe 
contraction of the demand for workers has prompted the Spanish government to reformulate 
many of the initiatives developed during the years of economic growth. 
 
The impact of the economic crisis on the employment of foreigners living in 
Spain 
The impact of the economic crisis has been particularly hard on the Spanish economy. Because 
the economy is overly dependent on construction and tourism the labor market has suffered a 
severe contraction. Recent statistics are alarming: the economy has shrunk 3% in the first 
trimester of 2009 and 4% in the second trimester compared to the same periods in 2008; in 
addition, unemployment is up 6% in the first trimester of the year, 2.9% higher than the last 
trimester. In real terms, this translates to a loss of 1 million full time jobs in just one year 
(Instituto Nacional de Estadística 2009e).  
The severe loss of jobs has serious social repercussions within the country. In the last 
12 months 1,755,900 workers have joined the ranks of the unemployed. Over the past year 
there has also been a considerable decrease in the number of people contributing to social 
security and a growing gap between the percentage of unemployed foreigners and natives. In 
2008 the unemployment rate reached 13.91% of the active population; but there is a huge 
difference between Spanish citizens and foreigners: among natives the unemployment rate was 
12.52% and among foreigners it was 8.7 points higher at 21.26% 
By the middle of 2009 the statistics were even worse: more than 4 million people 
were unemployed, representing 17.92% of the active population; and the unemployment rate 
for natives is 16% and 28% for foreigners. The difference between foreigners and natives has 
been increasing over the last few months, with the unemployment rate for foreigners now 
almost double that of natives. However, the latest statistics published by the Spanish Ministerio 
de Trabajo [Work Ministry] show that since the month of April the number of foreigners 
contributing to social security has gone up slightly, but this increase could be caused by the 
highly seasonal nature of some activities, such as hotel work, which allows for the temporary 
activity of unemployed workers. The impact of skyrocketing unemployment is devastating for 
Spanish households, especially if we consider that according to the data from the end of June 
2009 more than one million households have all of their active members on the unemployment 
roles.  
The effect of unemployment on the national and foreign population is not 
homogeneous. Unemployment affects males more than women and has dissimilar impacts on 
different groups of foreigners. As Godenau recently pointed out, “the Spanish labor market is 
segmented and the effects of the crisis are different for different segments. A large percentage 
of non-EU migrants work in the secondary economy, with clear signs of horizontal and vertical 
stratification, in jobs that are more sensitive to economic conditions” (Godenau 2009a). The 
most recent report published in Spain about immigration and the labor market (with data from 
the end of 2008) also indicates that Romanians, Ecuadorians and Moroccans had the greatest 
number of newly unemployed. However, unemployment was especially high among Moroccans 
(nearly 35%). Although unemployment rates are lower in other immigrant communities, such 
as the Bolivian and Paraguayan, the social conditions in these communities have deteriorated a 
great deal thanks to the higher rates of irregularity and employment in the informal economy, 
which has limited their ability to access unemployment benefits (Pajares 2009).  
Pajares’ study also indicates that unemployment and the economic crisis in general 
have significantly worsened the living conditions of many foreign residents. The biggest impact 
has been greater difficulty in renewing work permits and the inability to meet rent and 
mortgage payments in shared homes. In addition, it has been estimated that living conditions 
will get even worse when many immigrants run out of unemployment benefits (Pajares 2009). 
One of the most significant effects of the crisis has been the decreased ability of 
foreign workers to save money, which has led to a steep drop in the amount of money being 
sent to countries of origin. The data published by the Banco de España [the Central Bank of 
Spain] show that this is the greatest drop in remittances sent abroad since statistics have been 
kept on them. The latest data show that remittances valued at 1.653 billion euros were sent 
from Spain between January and March of 2009, which is a decrease of 17.2% from the 1.998 
billion sent during the same period in 2008 (Banco de España 2008).  
 
 
Creating new mechanisms to manage labor migrations and repurposing old 
ones: A new management mentality?  
During the first few years of this decade bad management of the quota system and the closure, 
in practice, of the “general system” –the conventional system through which foreign nationals 
accessed the labor market in accordance with the availability of jobs– led to a significant 
increase in irregular immigration (Aparicio and Roig 2006). However, a series of measures 
were adopted in 2004 to regulate the different ways that foreign workers could enter the 
country and to channel them where they were needed. The aim of these new regulations was 
to greatly reduce irregular immigration. In addition to reforming the quota system and 
reopening the general system, a new mechanism to manage migratory flows was included in 
the regulations known as the Special Catalog of Vacant Jobs, a list of jobs available in different 
provinces prepared by state employment agencies in employment areas where it is difficult to 
find sufficient workers to meet demand.  
Over the past few years these mechanisms have worked rather well, and although they 
have not been able to eradicate irregular labor situations, they have substantially increased the 
number of foreign workers who join the formal labor market.  
The question being asked now that we are facing a global systemic crisis is “how can 
we complete a puzzle that has more pieces than empty spaces?” 
During the period of economic growth and constant creation of new jobs that 
occurred over the past few years the market became the principle regulator of demand and 
provided the stimulus to “import” foreign labor, both in the formal and informal economies. In 
this model, which works fine as long as the economy continues to grow, state intervention was 
never proactive, but rather limited to regulating the constant influx of foreign immigrants into 
the labor market. The emphasis on recruiting foreign workers abroad over the past few years 
is derived from this approach. But now we must ask how to manage migratory flows in the 
current adverse economic situation where tension has arisen between structural objectives 
and political mechanisms. Demand for workers has clearly contracted, creating a large group of 
unemployed foreigners who were already settled in the country prior to these troubles.  
The Spanish government has launched several kinds of political initiatives to counteract 
the severe downturn in the economic cycle. The first set of measures focuses on containing 
the arrival of migratory labor flows by reducing the size of the foreign worker quotas and the 
Catalog of Vacant Jobs, while also paralyzing, for all intents and purposes, the bilateral hiring 
agreements with the countries of origin. The objective of these kinds of measures is to limit 
the number of foreign workers arriving in the country at a time when the economic situation 
is poor and the labor market is unable to provide jobs for the resident migrants already living 
in Spain. In the context of this crisis, the demand available in the Spanish labor market is for 
fewer and more specialized workers (such as domestic labor) and the old mechanisms to bring 
new workers in from abroad need to be frozen in order to help unemployed foreign residents 
find work.  
The second type of initiative has focused on creating incentives for unemployed 
immigrants to voluntarily return home, if their country has signed agreements with Spain 
regarding social security, including the lump payment of accumulated unemployment benefits. 
This program is known as APRE [Early Payment of Benefits to Foreigners Program] and does 
not include immigrants from other EU member states. APRE has been added to another 
voluntary return programs for immigrants in socially precarious situations (PREVIE)6
The third kind of measure seeks to improve the living conditions of immigrants and 
strengthen their social integration and civic inclusion by helping them exercise their social, 
economic and political rights.  This goal is considered to be particularly important as a way to 
avoid social conflicts between the native population and foreign residents arising due to the 
economic crisis, as well as ensuring that the living conditions of immigrants settled in Spain do 
not worsen considerably.  
 which 
was initiated in 2003 by the Spanish government to encourage foreigners who had lived in 
Spain for more than six months but who had no economic resources to return home. These 
programs have been managed by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and other 
NGOs since 2005. 
 
Containing the number of workers arriving from abroad 
Worker quotas 
As mentioned earlier, the worker quota is not a new management mechanism (Aparicio and 
Roig 2006). However, it must be pointed out that after 2006 the way it operates has been 
changed. This mechanism was originally designed to manage flows by recruiting foreign 
workers in accordance with the needs of the Spanish labor market from their country of 
origin; that is, the recruits could not be present in Spanish territory or reside there. This 
system is used to guarantee that jobs openings are not left vacant when they cannot be filled 
by native workers, workers from EU member states or other foreigners legally residing in 
Spain.  
The changes recently introduced to the quota policy were the ability to modify the 
number of available jobs throughout the year, to process only stable job offers (contracts 
lasting at least one year) and the creation of “job search” visas, which include two categories: 
visas for the children or grandchildren of Spanish citizens and visas provided to immigrants 
specializing in areas where there is a serious shortage of workers. In 2006 there were 16,878 
stable jobs offered through the quota system, 646 job search visas given by specific occupation 
or activity and 570 visas for Spanish descendants.  
The numbers show how the crisis has negatively affected this process. In 2007, which 
saw strong economic growth, 27,034 stable jobs were offered through the quota system, 455 
visas for domestic work and 500 visas for children and grandchildren of Spanish citizens to 
search for jobs. In 2008, as the growing economic crisis gradually became evident, the number 
of stable jobs was reduced to 15,731, a number that would be reduced by 90% in 2009, when 
the quota shrank to a mere 901 job offers.  
The Special Catalog of Vacant Jobs  
A new recruiting system was included in the 2005 immigration regulation, known as the Special 
Catalog of Vacant Jobs. Basically this catalog is a list of professions that have shortages of 
workers. The list is created by public employment services and approved and renewed every 
trimester. The catalog was developed to streamline the process of covering vacant positions 
by eliminating the need to publish job offers as was required by the general system. The 
statistics show that this method of channeling workers has been very successful. In 2006 there 
were 120,324 initial work and residence permits, 178,340 in 2007 and 136,604 in 2008. 
However, there were only 6,947 workers contracted in countries of origin in the first 
trimester of 2009.   
 
Bilateral agreements to hire workers in countries of origin 
These bilateral agreements, linked to the quota system policy, are designed to facilitate the 
recruitment of workers in a series of countries of origin. The innovation of this kind of 
agreement is that they include new countries of origin in a system which provides joint 
management of job offers (see Ferrero and López-Sala 2009). The regulation of this system is 
based on the specific agreements and has manifested in declarations of intention, joint 
declarations or the bilateral agreements themselves. 
 
Between 2004 and 2009 Spain has signed agreements of varying scope with the 
Philippines, Senegal, Ukraine and Mexico and is on the verge of signing new agreements with 
Paraguay, Bolivia and Moldavia. Other agreements had already been signed during the prior 
decade with various include Latin American countries, such as Columbia and Ecuador, and 
African countries, such as Morocco. Given that all these agreements are closely tied to the 
quota system, we can state that in light of the low number of job offers approved in 2009, at 
the moment the latest agreements are merely symbolic, but that they pave the way for an 
efficient recruitment system in these countries of origin when economic conditions once again 
improve.  
 
Creating incentives for voluntary return 
The voluntary return program for immigrants in socially precarious situations (PREVIE) 
and the early payment of unemployment benefits to foreigners program (APRE) 
With the arrival of the economic crisis to Spain, relatively new mechanisms to manage 
immigration have begun to be studied. One approach is to establish institutionally sponsored 
return programs (Pajares 2009). This kind of program has been used in different countries with 
varying results, but in general they have not been able to achieve their stated goal: to 
encourage immigrants to return to their countries of origin.  
  
The first program of this kind in Spain was launched in 2003, known as the voluntary 
return program for immigrants in socially precarious situations (PREVIE). This program is 
directed at non EU immigrants without resources who are living in a precarious social 
situation. The majority of the applicants have been immigrants who have not successfully 
integrated into Spanish society and who have left relatives under their protection back in their 
countries of origin. The voluntary return program provides them a ticket back to their country 
of origin, as well as covering other travel expenses. From 2003 more than 6,000 people have 
taken advantage of this program and the number of applicants has increased significantly in 
2008 and 2009. The number of people who have used this program in the first 6 months of 
2009 is equal to that of all 2008 and almost double the number in 2007. The immigrants who 
have used this program are primarily Argentineans, Bolivians, Brazilians and, to a lesser degree, 
Ecuadorians and Columbians. Although initially this program was used more often by women, 
over the last two years the economic crisis has increased the number of men applying to the 
program.  
But perhaps the most innovative program is the Early Payment of Benefits to 
Foreigners Program (APRE) which was approved in November, 2008. This program introduces 
an important new element: immigrant workers who use this program could receive lump 
payments for any accumulated unemployment benefits.   
Unlike PREVIE, in order to benefit from APRE applicants must have legal status in 
Spain. They must also be nationals of a country not in the EU which has a bilateral agreement 
on social security7 with Spain. In addition to returning to their country of origin, they must 
also promise not to return to Spain to reside or carry out a lucrative or professional activity, 
whether as an independent or contracted worker8
Since this is a relatively new program – it is still in its first year –it is still too soon to 
give a detailed analysis of the results. However, during the first eight months only 5,391 people 
have taken advantage of this program, to which must be added 2,271 relatives who have 
accompanied them back home.  Therefore, in the early stages of the program only 5% of the 
potential beneficiaries have opted to take part in the program.  
, for a period of three years. 
Unemployment benefits are received in two payments: 40% is paid in Spain and the remaining 
60% is paid in the country of origin a minimum of 30 days after the first payment, with a 
maximum period of 90 days.  In order to receive the second payment the beneficiaries must go 
to the Spanish consulate or diplomatic representative in their country of origin. 
More than 90% of the applications are from Latin American immigrants. The most are 
from Ecuador with 1,750 beneficiaries, followed by Columbia with 770, Argentina with 360, 
Peru with 334, Brazil with 215, Chile with 166 and Uruguay with 139. Moroccan immigrants, 
the community with the greatest number of potential beneficiaries, are not taking advantage of 
this program.  
In light of this data, we can conclude that so far the measures put into place to 
encourage immigrants to return home voluntarily have not been well received and had very 
little impact (Nair 2009). There are various reasons that could explain why so few immigrants 
have taken part in this program. In the first place, the poor living conditions in the countries of 
origin make the prospect of returning unattractive and in most cases the relatively small 
amount of unemployment benefits owed to the immigrants – on average 9,000 euros – is 
generally not enough to convince them to take such a big step. And finally, expectations that 
the economic situation in Spain will eventually improve lead many immigrants to “try and 
weather the storm” by adopting strategies that will allow them to stay in Spain rather than 
returning home9
Promoting social integration and improving the employability of immigrant 
workers 
.  
Another set of measures has been directed at improving the “employability” of foreign 
workers in Spain and promoting their social integration by encouraging them to exercise their 
political, economic and social rights. It is important to add that, although these kinds of 
measures have not been a direct result of the economic crisis, their application has real 
consequences in the process of maintaining peace and social cohesion. 
Reformation of the Immigration Law 
Although in general the Immigration Law has only been moderately reformed, it does include 
measures to reinforce the social integration of foreign residents. One way to reinforce social 
cohesion is to promote the civil and social rights of foreigners in Spain and the text of the law 
includes Constitutional Court judgments that fully acknowledge their rights to associate, 
protest, form trade unions and strike (Ruling 236/2007of the Tribunal Constitucional10
The draft law also states that all foreign minors in Spain have the right to education up 
to the age of 18, regardless of their legal status. Until now this right was only given until they 
were 16 years old, which is the age when obligatory education ends. The draft law also 
recognizes the right of legal foreign residents to have access to housing aid and also the right 
to work of spouses and children older than 16 who have been reunited with family members 
in Spain.  
). 
 
Reformation of Immigration Regulations  
Current policy is also trying to improve the situation of unemployed foreign residents by 
promoting residential and job mobility. This is one of the goals of the modification of the 
regulation on immigration approved by the Council of Ministers on July 10, 2009. In order to 
make it easier to find work in Spain, they have modified work authorizations to eliminate 
geographic or activity restrictions and also to allow foreign workers to transition between 
employment and self-employment. This mobility was not possible for foreigners under the 
prior legislation11
 
. These modifications will make it easier for foreign workers to work in 
different regions of Spain and change their economic activity. It will also be easier for 
immigrants to renew work authorizations when their work history shows a strong tie to their 
job, as well as for other foreigners who do not have a valid work contract at the time of 
renewal, if they have relatives that can maintain them while they are in Spain. 
Reciprocity agreements to vote in municipal elections 
Among the measures trying to promote social integration and cohesion we must include those 
that seek to encourage foreign residents to exercise their political rights. Since November, 
2008 the Spanish authorities have been negotiating and signing reciprocity agreements 
regarding the right to vote with fifteen countries that already recognize the right of Spanish 
citizens who are residents in their territory to vote. As of July, 2009 agreements have been 
signed with Columbia, Peru, Argentina, Trinidad and Tobago, Ecuador, Iceland, Burkina Faso, 
Cape Verde, Paraguay, the Republic of Korea and New Zealand. Spain is still negotiating 
agreements with Bolivia, Uruguay and Venezuela, with all three cases currently being reviewed 
by electoral authorities.  
These agreements cover the conditions under which foreigners can exercise the right 
to vote in Spain. Foreigners can vote if they have resided legally in the country for a 
continuous period of at least five years prior to their application to be included in the electoral 
census.  
 
Conclusions  
Managing immigration in Spain during this sharp economic and job crisis has not been easy. 
Surveys show that the majority of the Spanish population feels that migration policies should 
be modified because of the economic crisis. In fact, immigration is currently viewed as the 
third most important problem in Spain, after unemployment and the economic situation 
(Barómetro CIS 2008, 2009). 
Some experts have stated that the development of more restrictive immigration 
policies in response to the current economic crisis would come into conflict with the medium 
term needs of the Spanish economy. Because the active population in Spain is still aging rapidly, 
it is necessary to continue recruiting foreign workers; in addition, it is likely that the demand 
for labor will recover in areas of employment that the native population does not consider to 
be acceptable work (Felgueroso and Vázquez 2009; Godenau 2009b). It also does not seem 
likely that in the medium term the demand for domestic workers is going to contract, since 
Spanish women have joined the workforce en masse and this structural change requires what 
is known as the outsourcing of domestic work.  
The measures adopted by the government in the context of the crisis are directed at 
containing the arrival of foreign workers, creating incentives for voluntary returns and 
promoting social integration. The flexibility of the hiring mechanisms in countries of origin has 
allowed them to be adapted to the diminished demand for labor. The voluntary return 
programs have so far been ineffective and it appears likely that the immigrants will continue to 
adopt strategies that will allow them to avoid returning to their countries of origin. There are 
various reasons why so few immigrants have taken advantage of the voluntary return program: 
poor living conditions in their countries of origin, the relatively small amount of money they 
would receive from unemployment benefits or the expectation that the Spanish economy will 
recover in the short term.  
Finally, because one of the most basic goals of the Spanish government is to maintain 
social cohesion and the living conditions of immigrants it has focused on developing measures 
that will promote their social integration and consolidate their rights, despite the fact that 
these initiatives could produce a certain amount of resistance from the native population. 
 References 
Arango, J. (2006) “Europa y la inmigración. Una relación difícil” in Blanco, C. (ed.) Migraciones: 
Nuevas movilidades en un mundo en movimiento. Barcelona: Anthropos, 91-111. 
Aparicio, M. and Roig, E. (2006) “La entrada por razones laborales” in  Aja, E. and Arango, J. 
Veinte Años de Inmigración en España. Barcelona: Fundació CIDOB, 145-174. 
Baldwin- Edwards, M. and Arango, J. (eds.) (1999) Immigrants and the Informal Economy in 
Southern Europe. London: Frank Cass. 
Boletín Oficial de las Cortes Generales (2009) Proyecto de Ley Orgánica de reforma de la Ley 
Orgánica 4/2000, de 11 de enero, sobre derechos y libertades de los extranjeros en España y su 
integración social. 1 de julio de 2009. 
Cachón, L. (2002) “La formación de la España inmigrante: mercado y ciudadanía”, Revista 
Española de Investigaciones Sociológicas, 97: 95-126. 
Cachón, L. (2007) Inmigración y Mercado de Trabajo en España y en la Unión Europea. Foro de 
Inmigración. Madrid: Centro de Estudios Políticos y Constitucionales.  
Cachón, L. (2009) La España inmigrante: marco discriminatorio, mercado de trabajo y políticas de 
integración. Barcelona: Anthropos.  
Dolado, J. and Vázquez, P. (eds.)(2008) Ensayos sobre los efectos económicos de la inmigración en 
España. Madrid: FEDEA. 
Fundación de Estudios de Economía Aplicada (FEDEA) (2009) La crisis de la economía española: 
lecciones y propuestas. Madrid. 
Felgueroso, F. and Vázquez, P. (2009) “Inmigración y crisis: aciertos, desaciertos y políticas 
complementarias” in La crisis de la economía española: lecciones y propuestas. Madrid. FEDEA. 
Ferrero, R. and López-Sala, A. (2009)“Nuevas dinámicas de la gestión de las migraciones en 
España: el caso de los acuerdos bilaterales de trabajadores con los países de origen”, Revista del 
Ministerio de Trabajo e Inmigración, 80: 119-132. 
Godenau, D (2009a): “Inmigración, crisis y mercado de trabajo” in Seminario Las Políticas 
Migratorias en tiempos de crisis. La Coruña, 29 de junio de 2009.  
Godenau, D. (2009b) "Inmigración, crisis y mercado de trabajo en Canarias", in Claves de la 
economía canaria para el futuro: impacto de la crisis. La Laguna: Real Sociedad Económica de 
Amigos del País de Tenerife. 
Instituto Nacional de Estadística (2009a) Avance del Padrón Municipal de Habitantes a 1 de enero 
de 2009. Datos provisionales. Junio de 2009. Madrid. 
Instituto Nacional de Estadística (2009b) Encuesta de Población Activa (EPA). Cuarto trimestre 
de 2008. Madrid. 
Instituto Nacional de Estadística (2009c) Encuesta de Población Activa (EPA). Primer trimestre 
de 2009. Madrid. 
Instituto Nacional de Estadística (2009d) Encuesta de Población Activa (EPA). Segundo trimestre 
de 2009. Madrid. 
Instituto Nacional de Estadística (2009e) Contabilidad Nacional Trimestral de España. Primer 
trimestre de 2009. Madrid. 
Izquierdo, A. (1996) La inmigración inesperada. Madrid: Trota. 
Izquierdo, A. (2006). “Cuatro razones para pensar en la inmigración irregular” in Blanco, C. 
(ed.) Migraciones: Nuevas movilidades en un mundo en movimiento. Barcelona: Anthropos, 139-
159. 
Pajares, M. (2007) Inmigración y mercado de trabajo. Informe 2007. Madrid: Observatorio 
Permanente de la Inmigración, 14. Ministerio de Trabajo e Inmigración. 
Pajares, M. (2008) Inmigración y mercado de trabajo. Informe 2008. Madrid: Observatorio 
Permanente de la Inmigración, 17. Ministerio de Trabajo e Inmigración. 
Pajares, M.  (2009): Inmigración y mercado de trabajo. Informe 2009. Madrid: Observatorio 
Permanente de la Inmigración, 21. Ministerio de Trabajo e Inmigración.   
Oficina Económica del Presidente del Gobierno (2006) Inmigración y economía española: 1996-
2006. Madrid. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1  Of these 5.5 million less than half, 2.3 million are citizens of the European Union (Instituto Nacional de 
Estadística 2009a). 
2 The term befallen irregularity refers to two ways in which a foreigner can become an “irregular” immigrant. The 
first is when a foreign national overstays a tourist visa. In this case they use the tourist visa, which is valid for three 
months, to enter Spanish territory and once it expires they stay, thus becoming “irregular”. The second type of 
befallen irregularity results mainly from slow bureaucracy and the understaffing of public services which renew 
residence and labor permits, or with the difficulty in finding a new job when a previous one ends. In this case, a 
worker with a valid work visa is unable to renew their authorization but stay in Spain anyway, again becoming 
“irregular”. 
3 This labor demand also explains the geographic patterns of where immigrants settle in Spain, which tends to be in 
the richer regions that have greater productive diversification or greater weight in productive sectors, such as 
Madrid, Catalonia, Andalusia, Valencia, Murcia and the two island regions, the Balearic Islands and the Canaries.  
 
4 The Encuesta de Población Activa (EPA) [Economically Active Population Survey (EAPS)] is a survey that has been 
carried out every trimester since 1964 by the Instituto Nacional de Estadística [Spanish Statistical Office, a 
government institution which collects and distributes official statistics about Spain]. Its goal is to obtain information 
about the working population and its different labor categories, as well as about the inactive population. The 
advantage that this survey has over other sources is that it collects information about national and foreign workers 
in the formal economy as well as in the informal economy. It is the best source of information to understand the 
Spanish labor market and the employment of foreign immigrants.  
5 Plan Global de Coordinacion y regulacion de la Extranjeria y la Inmigracion [Global Coordination and Regulation 
of Immigration Plan], known as the Plan GRECO. 
6 PREVICAT and PREVICAM are two other programs for immigrants living in the autonomous communities of 
Catalonia and Madrid who meet the same requirements. There is also another return program which assists 
immigrants with their reintegration upon return, by providing them financial assistance to carry out productive 
projects when they return to their countries of origin.  
7 There are agreements with Morocco, Ecuador, Peru, Argentina, Ukraine, Columbia, Brazil, Chile, Uruguay, 
Andorra, United States, Canada, Australia, Philippines, Dominican Republic, Tunis, Russia and Paraguay. 
 
8 Official estimates indicate that approximately 130,000 people meet these requirements and can potentially benefit 
from this program. The main nationalities of these potential beneficiaries are, in order of size, Morocco, Ecuador, 
Columbia, Peru, Argentina and Ukraine. 
 
9 Among the strategies indicated by Godenau: reducing spending, increasing the number of people in a family who 
look for work, changing profession, moving to a different region, reducing the remittances that they send back 
home or selective return (Godenau 2009 a, 2009b). 
10 The Tribunal Constitucional [Constitutional Court] is the high court that makes final rulings on questions 
regarding the Spanish Constitution. 
11 Article 49.2 of R.D 2393/2004, December 30. 
